Research
Research
My work investigates the nature and normative implications of identity. I am developing a systematic treatment of problems pertaining to the metaphysics of identity and distinctness, including Black's two-sphere world, the statue and the clay, and the problem of the many. I am also developing theories about the nature of persons and the grounds of the distinctive and first-personal value that survival (at least sometimes) has.
My goal is to discover the worldly, normative, and representational importance of identity -- that is, the determining role that identity plays in what's going on making the world the way it is, making our practices the way they are, and how the truth of identity statements shapes our thinking about the world. My findings are presented below.
The Identity of Necessary Indiscernibles
(Forthcoming, Philosophers' Imprint)
Abstract: I propose a novel metaphysical explanation of identity and distinctness facts called the Modal Proposal. According to the Modal Proposal, for each identity fact – that is, each fact of the form a=b – that fact is metaphysically explained by the fact that it is necessary that the entities involved are indiscernible; and for each distinctness fact – each fact of the form a≠b – that fact is metaphysically explained by the fact that it is possible for the entities involved to be discernible. I argue that the Modal Proposal has greater payoffs at less cost than any of its competitors. It gives simple, uniform, and intuitive explanations of identity and distinctness that conserve longstanding philosophical insights about identity that go back to Leibniz. It does this while making our fundamental base more parsimonious, determining whether controversial cases of identity or distinctness are possible, and expanding our understanding of these central philosophical relations.
What Matters in Personal Transformation (Under Review)
Abstract: When we die, we lose something of distinctive first-personal value. It may seem that this is just life itself. However, certain cases of personal transformation – events in which we survive despite radical changes to important psychological features, such as our personality, cognitive capacities, or values – are instances of survival where we suffer similar loss. In this paper, I argue that these cases support a multidimensional view of the distinctive first-personal value of survival. This view helps us understand how personal transformation can involve genuine first-personal loss. I’ll also argue that at least some of the verdicts that support the multidimensional view also support the Stage Theory of persistence.
What Counts When Counting
Suppose I set a mug on my empty desk. The statement “there is exactly one thing on my desk” seems true. But ordinary counting statements like this face serious challenges. One challenge comes from abundant ontological theories, such as Plenitude and Mereological Universalism, which posit numerous extraordinary entities overlapping ordinary objects. If these theories are true, then there are many objects in addition to the mug on my desk. Another challenge is from the standard theory of complex objects. Complex objects, like the mug, are made up of many distinct proper parts. Just as the mug is on the desk, so are its proper parts.
In this paper, I’ll argue that the truth of our ordinary counting statements is consistent with abundant ontologies and the standard theory of complex objects. The apparent conflicts are due to the mistaken assumption that we count by identity – that is, that we count each distinct entity in the relevant domain. I’ll propose an account of what makes counting statements true according to which we count each discriminable object in the relevant domain, where objects are discriminable when it is instrumentally permissible to employ one’s knowledge of their distinctness. This account vindicates the truth of our ordinary counting statements.
Covert Counterspeech
Abstract: We ought to speak up when we can. However, speaking up can sometimes be dangerous and counterproductive. Sometimes speaking up risks being met with violence. And even when there are no physical risks, speaking up can risk social, economic, or political harms. Moreover, speaking up is sometimes counterproductive. It may bring more attention to the speech one aims to counter, or incite backlash that ultimately helps the cause one is opposing. Effectively speaking up requires one to navigate these risks.
In this paper, I argue that we can avoid many of these issues using a kind of speaking up that I call covert counter-speech which works by activating latent positive attitudes in one’s audience without their awareness. I will argue that covert counter-speech is particularly effective against certain kinds of harmful speech, namely, covert dogwhistles. To make this argument, I will present two problems that Langton’s (2018) overt counter-speech faces when used against covert dogwhistles that covert counter-speech avoids.