Research
Research
My work investigates the nature and normative implications of identity. I am developing a systematic treatment of problems pertaining to the metaphysics of identity and distinctness, including Black's two-sphere world, the statue and the clay, and the problem of the many. I am also developing theories about the nature of persons and the grounds of the distinctive and first-personal value that survival (at least sometimes) has.
My goal is to discover the worldly, normative, and representational importance of identity -- that is, the determining role that identity plays in what's going on making the world the way it is, making our practices the way they are, and how the truth of identity statements shapes our thinking about the world. My findings are presented below.
The Identity of Necessary Indiscernibles
(Forthcoming, Philosophers' Imprint)
Abstract: I propose a novel metaphysical explanation of identity and distinctness facts called the Modal Proposal. According to the Modal Proposal, for each identity fact – that is, each fact of the form a=b – that fact is metaphysically explained by the fact that it is necessary that the entities involved are indiscernible; and for each distinctness fact – each fact of the form a≠b – that fact is metaphysically explained by the fact that it is possible for the entities involved to be discernible. I argue that the Modal Proposal has greater payoffs at less cost than any of its competitors. It gives simple, uniform, and intuitive explanations of identity and distinctness that conserve longstanding philosophical insights about identity that go back to Leibniz. It does this while making our fundamental base more parsimonious, determining whether controversial cases of identity or distinctness are possible, and expanding our understanding of these central philosophical relations.
What Matters in Personal Transformation
(Under review)
Abstract: When we die, we lose something of distinctive first-personal value. It may seem that this is just life itself. However, certain cases of personal transformation – events in which we survive despite radical changes to important psychological features, such as our personality, cognitive capacities, or values – are instances of survival where we suffer similar loss. In this paper, I argue that these cases support a multidimensional view of the distinctive first-personal value of survival. This view helps us understand how personal transformation can involve genuine first-personal loss. I’ll also argue that at least some of the verdicts that support the multidimensional view also support the Stage Theory of persistence.
What Counts When Counting: Discriminability, Ontology, and the Number of Things
(Under review)
Abstract: Our ordinary counting statements face serious challenges, both from abundant ontologies that posit extraordinary entities and from the fact that material objects are composed of many parts. This paper develops a metaphysical account of what makes such statements true – one that vindicates our ordinary counting statements. According to the Discriminability Account, what makes a counting statement true is that an individual’s psychological counting procedure approximates an ideal counting procedure according to which we count each discriminable object in the domain, where objects are discriminable when it is instrumentally permissible to employ one’s knowledge of their distinctness. This account draws on cognitive science research on selective attention and enumeration to identify the role of psychological counting procedures in the truth of counting statements. On this view, ordinary counters are justified in ignoring extraordinary entities posited by Plenitude and Mereological Universalism, as well as objects’ parts. The account explains why our ordinary counting statements are insulated from ontological abundance.
Exceeding Extreme: On the Relevance of Identity to Prudence
(In progress)
Abstract: Many philosophers have endorsed the Identity Irrelevance Claim, the claim that identity does not, in itself, justify future-directed prudential concern. In this paper, I argue that those who endorse this claim ought to accept the Stage Theory of persistence. This is because the Identity Irrelevance Claim together with theories of persistence by identity (i.e. Endurantism and Perdurantism) entail implausible views about the nature of prudential value and its relation to prudential concern. An upshot of this argument is that inquiry into the relationship between the metaphysics of persistence and prudence ought to attend to prudential value, and not just prudential concern.
Covert Counterspeech
(Draft available upon request)
Abstract: We ought to speak up when we can. However, speaking up can sometimes be dangerous and even counterproductive. Effective counterspeech requires one to navigate these risks. In this paper, I argue that we can navigate these risks using strategies that I call covert counterspeech, counterspeech that works by activating latent positive attitudes in one’s audience without their awareness. I will argue that covert counterspeech is particularly effective against certain kinds of harmful speech, such as covert dogwhistles. To make this argument, I will present two problems that Langton’s (2018) overt counterspeech faces against covert dogwhistles that covert counter-speech avoids.